A Case Study Analysis Of London Fire Brigade

Introduction

The London Fire Brigade (London Fire Brigade) is the UK’s largest fire and rescue service, serving over 180,000 residents in Greater London per year (London Fire Brigade, n.d.; London Fire Brigade, 2022). Organisational structure refers to the formal arrangement of roles, responsibilities and authority – essentially “the vertical and horizontal configuration of departments, authority and jobs within an organisation” (Lazenby et al., 2015). Organisational culture is the shared values, beliefs and norms that shape how members behave and interact (Taylor et al; 2018; Ketprapakorn and Kantabutra, 2022). Both structure and culture significantly influence a public sector organisation’s effectiveness. This introduction outlines the aims of analysing London Fire Brigade’s structure and culture, using organisational behaviour (OB) theory frameworks. The goal is to evaluate how London Fire Brigade’s bureaucratic structure and organisational culture (as a UK public sector culture example) have impacted its efficiency and performance, especially during crises, and to propose evidence-based recommendations for improvement.

Overview of London Fire Brigade

London Fire Brigade is the statutory fire and rescue service for London, established in 1865. It employs nearly 6,000 staff (about 5,000 of them firefighters) and operates 102 fire stations across the 1,587 km² of Greater London (London Fire Brigade, n.d.). The brigade is led by the London Fire Commissioner, a corporation sole who acts as the fire and rescue authority for London (London Fire Brigade, n.d.). Governance is provided through the Greater London Authority and the Mayor’s Office, which took over oversight from the former London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority in 2018 (London Fire Brigade, 2025). London Fire Brigade’s statutory role, defined by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, includes firefighting, rescue, fire safety education and responding to emergencies such as floods, road accidents and terrorist incidents (UK Parliament, 2004). As the busiest fire service in the UK (London Fire Brigade, n.d.), London Fire Brigade attends thousands of calls annually and plays a critical role in London’s public safety infrastructure.

Theoretical Framework

Handy’s Organisational Culture Typology: Charles Handy (a renowned OB scholar) categorised organisational culture into four types: power culture, role culture, task culture, and person culture (Gavriilidis, 2021). In a power culture, control is centralised with a key figure or small group, and authority stems from personal power. A role culture is bureaucratic: it values rules, procedures and clearly defined roles; stability and efficiency are prized over individual initiative (Javaheri et al., 2023). A task culture is team-oriented and adaptable, assembling flexible teams to solve problems (common in project-driven organisations) (Handy, 1993). A person culture places individual talent and autonomy above the organisation (more typical of professional partnerships or creative fields) (Handy, 1993). Handy’s framework is useful for diagnosing London Fire Brigade’s culture – which, as a public emergency service, might be expected to emphasize roles and hierarchy (role culture) but also requires teamwork under pressure (task culture) during incidents.

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Mintzberg’s Organisational Structure Model: Henry Mintzberg’s theory identifies five ideal structural configurations: entrepreneurial (simple structure), machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisionalised form, and adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1983; Mustafa et al., 2022). Each has a “key part” of the organisation and a primary coordination mechanism. A machine bureaucracy relies on standardised processes and a strong technostructure; it is highly centralised, with a clear chain of command (Hinterdorfer, 2025). A professional bureaucracy relies on the skills and autonomy of professionals (coordination by standardised skills – seen in hospitals or universities). London Fire Brigade, with its regimented procedures and rank structure, shares features of a machine bureaucracy – fitting Mintzberg’s subtype of a “contingency bureaucracy” that “exists not to provide routine services, but to stand ready” for emergency events. Mintzberg specifically cited fire departments as examples, noting they have elaborate standard procedures so that when a crisis occurs, responders can act quickly and efficiently as trained (Sydnes, 2011). However, in truly novel emergencies these organisations must also become flexible and centralised under crisis leaders (Sydnes, 2011). Mintzberg and Handy’s frameworks thus provide a lens to examine how London Fire Brigade’s formal structure and underlying culture function, especially in critical incidents.

Organisational Structure Analysis (London Fire Brigade)

London Fire Brigade’s organisational structure is a classic hierarchical bureaucracy. It has multiple layers of rank (firefighter, crew manager, watch manager, station commander, borough commander, up to Assistant Commissioners and the Commissioner). This vertical structure concentrates strategic authority at the top (Commissioner and Directors), while horizontal differentiation separates functions (e.g. Operations, Fire Safety, Control Room, Training). The structure aligns closely with Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy: there is a high degree of formalisation, with standard operating procedures governing fireground tactics, safety protocols, and communication (Wonnink, 2025). The “technostructure” (policy and training units) develops detailed procedures and training programs that firefighters must follow, reflecting Mintzberg’s observation that in machine bureaucracies work processes are standardised centrally (Wonnik, 2025). In routine operations, this yields consistency and efficiency – every fire crew follows the same incident command system and safety checks.

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However, decentralisation within London Fire Brigade is limited. Front-line incident commanders (e.g. a watch manager arriving first at an incident) have authority to make operational decisions on scene, but they operate within a rigid incident command structure. Major strategic shifts (such as evacuating a building) typically require approval from more senior officers (London Fire Brigade, 2019). Prior to 2017, London Fire Brigade’s structure showed shortcomings in handling an unprecedented disaster. As per Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s phase 1 report, during the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, the initial incident commanders were relatively junior and “faced a situation for which they had not been properly prepared” (Moore-Bick, 2019). They adhered to established protocol (“stay put” advice for high-rise fires) and did not feel empowered to deviate from it. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report found that “they neither truly seized control of the situation nor were able to change strategy” in the crucial first hour (Moore-Bick, 2019). This highlights a structural rigidity: decision-making authority had not been effectively decentralised to allow on-scene officers to overrule a policy even as evidence mounted that conditions demanded evacuation. Additional senior officers did arrive as the incident escalated, but command-and-control deficiencies were evident – some senior officers “failed to give sufficient practical support or inform themselves quickly enough of conditions” inside the tower (Moore-Bick, 2019). It took nearly an hour until a senior commissioner (Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe) arrived and finally revoked the stay-put order at 02:47 am, illustrating how the hierarchical structure delayed a critical tactical change (Moore-Bick, 2019).

Structural communication channels also proved flawed. London Fire Brigade’s control room (handling 999 calls) was organisationally separate from the incident command on the ground. The inquiry noted “no systematic arrangements were made for information about the number and source of fire survival calls to be communicated to incident commanders” (Moore-Bick, 2019). In effect, the brigade’s structure did not facilitate real-time intelligence sharing between the control centre and firefighters at the scene. This was a structural issue that the inquiry addressed through specific recommendations – for example, that London Fire Brigade develop a system for direct communication between the control room and the incident commander (Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2021). In response, London Fire Brigade has since implemented technological solutions (radio talkgroups and software) to link control rooms with incident command units (Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2021).

Overall, London Fire Brigade’s formal structure pre-Grenfell was highly centralised and procedure-bound – suitable for anticipated emergencies, but less adaptive for extreme events. The “contingency bureaucracy” Mintzberg described functioned effectively for routine fires (where standard drills suffice), yet struggled when facing a contingency that fell outside prior experience (Lin, 2024). The Grenfell incident forced London Fire Brigade to re-examine this. In the aftermath, structural changes were made: mobilising senior officers more quickly to large incidents, improving the span of control at complex scenes, and strengthening inter-agency coordination. By 2024, His Majesty’s Inspectorate noted London Fire Brigade had implemented all 29 Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations – including structural improvements in communication and incident management (Cook, 2024). London Fire Brigade’s structure remains largely bureaucratic, but with reforms to make it more responsive (e.g. new incident command protocols and better control room integration). The challenge going forward is balancing the need for hierarchy and standardisation (critical for safety and coordination) with the need for decentralised agility, so that frontline commanders can act on real-time realities in a crisis.

Organisational Culture Analysis (London Fire Brigade)

London Fire Brigade’s organisational culture has historically been characterised by hierarchy, tradition and a strong sense of mission – but also faced criticism for being insular and resistant to change. Using Handy’s typology, London Fire Brigade exhibits a dominant role culture. In a role culture, authority is defined by position and role descriptions, and individuals are expected to adhere to their specific responsibilities (Javaheri et al., 2023). London Fire Brigade’s rank-oriented culture fits this: firefighters and officers are very aware of the chain of command and “the way things are done.” This culture brings order and discipline; for example, fire crews drilling regularly and following standard commands on the fireground reflects a culture where stability, efficiency and predictability are valued over individual improvisation (Javaheri et al., 2023). The implicit motto is to “do your duty” within your role. Such a culture can foster unit cohesion and clarity in emergencies (where everyone knows their role). Indeed, London Fire Brigade firefighters are known for extraordinary courage and teamwork within their units (Moore-Bick, 2019). Elements of task culture emerge informally when crews respond to incidents – they operate as tight-knit teams solving problems under pressure (a task-oriented subculture during emergency operations) (Engel et al., 2022; Bonetto et al., 2024).

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However, a role culture in a public sector bureaucracy can have downsides: it may discourage questioning authority and hinder organisational learning (Ashol et al., 2021). The Grenfell Inquiry exposed cultural issues at London Fire Brigade – notably a failure to learn from past mistakes. The Inquiry chair found “justified concern that the London Fire Brigade as an institution had failed to learn or put into practice the lessons” of a prior fatal high-rise fire at Lakanal House in 2009 – mistakes (such as communication failures and delays in abandoning “stay put”) that were tragically repeated at Grenfell (Moore-Bick, 2019). This suggests a culture resistant to change, where new knowledge was not effectively absorbed into practice – a hallmark of a bureaucratic culture that defaults to established routines. Firefighters at Grenfell “were faced with a situation for which they had not been properly prepared” and could not conceive of deviating from stay-put policy (Moore-Bick, 2019). Hand-in-hand with structure, the culture did not encourage challenging standard procedure; junior officers hesitated to escalate or change strategy without direction from above, reflecting a cultural norm of deference to hierarchy.

Reports after Grenfell also describe a culture of insularity and defensiveness in London Fire Brigade’s leadership at the time. Notably, the then-Commissioner’s initial reaction was to insist she would not have done anything differently on the night, which was widely criticised as indicative of a poor learning culture. The Inquiry noted “questions whether [London Fire Brigade] is capable of learning from its mistakes” (Moore-Bick, 2019). This lack of a learning culture is a serious concern in a high-risk organisation – it can lead to repeated failures (Hald et al., 2021). It appears that before 2017, London Fire Brigade’s organisational culture placed insufficient emphasis on critical reflection and adaptability.

Moreover, an independent cultural review in 2022 exposed deep-rooted behavioural and inclusion problems in London Fire Brigade. The review (led by Nazir Afzal) concluded that London Fire Brigade was “institutionally misogynist and racist”, citing numerous instances of bullying, harassment and discrimination experienced by minority and female staff (Winchester, 2022). Accounts included sexist “banter”, racism, and even abusive pranks (one firefighter’s helmet was allegedly filled with urine as a joke) – all signs of a toxic subculture that had been allowed to fester (Giampetro-Meyer and Magee, 2024). Such behaviours point to a power culture element within certain London Fire Brigade stations or watch units, where clique dynamics and masculine, domineering attitudes prevailed. The presence of this toxic culture indicates that while the formal culture was role-based, informal power structures and prejudices went unchallenged for too long (Sulaeman, et al., 2024). There was also a fear of speaking up: many junior or under-represented members did not report bad behaviour, suggesting low trust in management and poor organisational justice (Winchester, 2022).

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Handy’s person culture is least evident in London Fire Brigade – individuals are expected to subsume to the team and organisation’s standard. However, after these critical reviews, London Fire Brigade’s culture has been forced to evolve. The crisis-driven cultural change in recent years has included a top-down push for openness and accountability. Current Commissioner Andy Roe publicly apologised and has committed to root out the toxic elements (Winchester, 2022). London Fire Brigade has been implementing new values and ethics training, encouraging firefighters to call out misconduct, and increasing diversity efforts. In effect, the brigade is attempting to shift towards a healthier role/task culture blend: maintaining the positive aspects of a disciplined role culture (duty, teamwork) while fostering a learning-oriented, inclusive culture where safety concerns and new ideas can travel upward. External inspections support that progress: by 2023–24 HMICFRS reported London Fire Brigade was “making good progress to improve culture”, though it still “must continue to build staff trust and confidence in processes to deal with poor behaviour” (HMICFRS, 2024; Cook, 2024). This implies culture change is underway but not complete – deeply embedded attitudes take time to change.

In summary, London Fire Brigade’s organisational culture has been a double-edged sword. Its traditional role culture provided a strong identity and clarity of command, essential for emergency response, but also bred complacency and insularity that contributed to failures like Grenfell. Recent reckonings have prompted introspection and reforms to create a more open, learning and equitable culture. The case illustrates how culture in a UK public sector organisation like London Fire Brigade is crucial to performance – especially in crises, where a culture that balances discipline with adaptability can save lives.

Impact Analysis: Structure and Culture on Performance

Impact on Operational Efficiency

London Fire Brigade’s bureaucratic structure and culture have directly affected its efficiency and effectiveness. In positive terms, a clear hierarchy and standard procedures ensure a consistent, coordinated response to routine incidents (Farok and Zolkipli, 2024). For everyday fires and emergencies, London Fire Brigade meets performance targets – for example, in 2022–23 it continued to “respond quickly to fires” and prioritise high-risk safety visits, earning a good rating for emergency response (Cook, 2024). The role culture fosters discipline; firefighters drill and deploy in a uniform manner, which can enhance efficiency when dealing with predictable incidents (Muradi et L., 2022). However, the same structure and culture have at times hampered agility. The Grenfell Tower fire demonstrated that an overly rigid structure and “stay-in-your-lane” culture delayed critical action. Junior commanders waited for approval to change strategy, losing precious time (Moore-Bick, 2019). Information silos (control room vs incident ground) reduced efficiency of communication, as noted by the inquiry (Moore-Bick, 2019). Thus, in novel scenarios the hierarchical structure initially impeded an efficient response, showing that efficiency in routine operations can trade off with adaptability in extreme events.

Impact on Communication

Organisational structure defines communication flow in London Fire Brigade. The formal chain of command means information typically flows upward through layers. In dynamic incidents, this can lead to delays or distortion. The Grenfell Inquiry highlighted that critical information from front-line firefighters (e.g. about fire spread) was not effectively shared with incident commanders or the control room (Moore-Bick, 2019), partly because there was no mechanism for direct communication across certain levels. Post-incident reviews recommended structural fixes – e.g. dedicated communication channels between the control room and the incident commander (Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2021). Culturally, the deference to rank sometimes inhibits upward communication (Dai et al., 2022); firefighters might be reluctant to “challenge” decisions or escalate concerns due to a culture of respecting hierarchy. Internal surveys and testimonies (such as those in the 2022 culture review) indicated that some staff did not feel safe to speak up about problems (Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2021). This psychological safety issue can stifle the flow of vital safety information (Battye, 2024). On the other hand, within crews on the fireground, a strong team ethos supports open communication in the moment – firefighters trust each other with their lives and often develop unspoken coordination (a positive cultural facet) (Qian et al., 2025). London Fire Brigade’s recent efforts to improve communication include new technology (e.g. providing incident commanders with live info from control via tablets/radio) and cultural training to encourage more candid two-way communication in the organisation. Effective emergency response depends on accurate information sharing (Andreassen et al., 2020), so these changes aim to mitigate the structural and cultural barriers that were evident.

Impact on Leadership and Decision-Making

The interplay of structure and culture influences leadership style in London Fire Brigade. Traditionally, leadership was top-down – commanders give orders, firefighters follow. This worked well for managing large teams in emergency situations (consistent with a role culture and machine bureaucracy). But it also meant innovation and strategic decisions were concentrated at the top. During crises like Grenfell, the lack of initiative at lower levels was partly a leadership culture issue: incident commanders on scene did not feel empowered to deviate from standard procedure without a superior’s instruction (Moore-Bick, 2019). This suggests that the culture did not encourage proactive decision-making at lower levels in extraordinary circumstances. The impact was a delay in adapting strategy, which, as the Inquiry found, “would be likely to have resulted in fewer fatalities” had it happened sooner (Moore-Bick, 2019). Leadership at the senior level also came under scrutiny – the Inquiry and HMICFRS noted that London Fire Brigade’s senior leaders had not sufficiently instilled a culture of learning or accountability prior to 2017 (HMICFRS, 2022; Moore-Bick, 2019). Since then, there has been turnover and reform in leadership (a new Commissioner and leadership team committed to culture change). The impact of a more open, reflective leadership approach is starting to be seen: by 2024, HMICFRS reported improvements in how London Fire Brigade develops leaders and manages performance, though more work was needed to identify high-potential staff and mentor them (HMICFRS, 2024; Cook, 2024). Leadership is now focused on rebuilding trust internally – Commissioner Roe’s response to the cultural review, for instance, involved “several measures aimed at addressing the core problems” and a public apology (Winchester, 2022). The long-term performance of London Fire Brigade will hinge on sustaining this new leadership culture that values accountability and empowerment across all levels.

Impact on Morale and Personnel Performance

London Fire Brigade’s organisational culture issues have had tangible impacts on staff morale, well-being and ultimately performance. The 2022 independent review revealed many firefighters, particularly women and those from minority backgrounds, felt alienated or traumatised by bullying and bias (Winchester, 2022). Such a toxic environment can lead to high turnover, absenteeism, and mental health issues (Sulaeman et al., 2024; Rasool; et al., 2021; George, 2023) – indeed, the review was partly triggered by the tragic suicide of a trainee firefighter in 2020 who had reportedly experienced racist bullying (Winchester, 2022). Low morale and fear of harassment certainly undermine operational performance: a team that is divided or where individuals feel unsafe will not perform optimally under pressure (Oginni, 2024; Thomaston, 2023). Conversely, as observed earlier, positive cultural traits – camaraderie, pride, public service ethos – have historically boosted London Fire Brigade’s performance. Many firefighters report feeling a strong sense of family within their watch and deep commitment to the mission of saving lives. This pride in the brigade likely contributed to heroic efforts at incidents like Grenfell, where firefighters repeatedly entered a burning high-rise at personal risk. Thus, London Fire Brigade’s culture has facets that greatly enhance performance (esprit de corps, bravery ingrained in identity) and facets that detract from it (internal mistrust, lack of inclusion).

Impact on Organisational Learning and Improvement

One of the clearest cultural impacts has been on London Fire Brigade’s ability to learn and improve after incidents. As noted, a culture that did not sufficiently embrace criticism or external input meant lessons from Lakanal were not absorbed, with fatal consequences later (Moore-Bick, 2019). This “learning disability” meant performance improvements lagged; only after Grenfell – under intense public scrutiny – did London Fire Brigade comprehensively implement changes like new high-rise firefighting training, equipment (e.g. smoke hoods for evacuating residents) and updated policies (Cook, 2024). The infusion of a learning culture since 2017 is gradually yielding results: operational improvements have been made (for example, London Fire Brigade now has evacuation procedures for high-rise fires where “stay put” fails, and conducts regular exercises simulating such scenarios) (Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2021). The HMICFRS in 2021–22 placed London Fire Brigade into an enhanced monitoring status due to concerns (partly cultural), but by late 2024 the inspectorate noted “significant improvements” and removed London Fire Brigade from special measures (HMICFRS, 2022; Cook, 2024). They even graded London Fire Brigade “outstanding” in responding to major incidents (Cook, 2024), reflecting that changes in structure (e.g. better incident command protocols) and culture (more openness to multi-agency working and criticism) have positively impacted performance. Importantly, the report confirmed London Fire Brigade had implemented all Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations (Cook, 2024), indicating an organisation now actively learning from past failures.

In summary, London Fire Brigade’s structure and culture have had profound and sometimes tragic impacts on its performance. A rigid hierarchy and traditional culture provided strength in routine operations but were liabilities in an unprecedented crisis, contributing to loss of life at Grenfell. Subsequently, these aspects have been reformed – making the brigade more communicative, self-critical and people-focused. Early evidence (inspection reports, improved incident outcomes) suggests these changes are improving London Fire Brigade’s effectiveness and public trust. The London Fire Brigade case reinforces a key OB insight: structure and culture must be continually aligned with the organisation’s environment and mission. In a high-risk, dynamic context, a culture of continual learning and a structure that empowers timely decision-making are as vital as hoses and fire engines for performance.

Recommendations

Drawing on the above analysis, several recommendations can be made to strengthen London Fire Brigade’s organisational structure, leadership and culture. These aim to ensure the brigade learns from past lessons (notably Grenfell) and continues evolving into a more effective and inclusive organisation:

• Empower Decentralised Decision-Making: London Fire Brigade should decentralise authority in critical incidents by further empowering and training frontline commanders. For example, by 2025 London Fire Brigade can implement a protocol that any incident commander at a major incident (e.g. fire in a high-rise) can call for an evacuation or “major incident” status without awaiting higher approval, if conditions merit. Regular simulation drills should reinforce that incident commanders are trusted to exercise discretion in novel scenarios. This addresses delays like those at Grenfell, fostering a culture where following procedure and thinking critically are balanced. Senior leadership must explicitly back crews who make timely, if imperfect, decisions in an unfolding crisis.
• Improve Communication Structures and Technology: Building on Grenfell Inquiry recommendations, London Fire Brigade should deploy a robust communication system linking control rooms and incident grounds. By mid-2024, the brigade should finish rolling out tools (such as direct radio channels or live data feeds) so that information (e.g. multiple fire survival calls) reaches the incident commander in real time. Additionally, an officer should be embedded in the control room for major incidents to act as liaison – a practice already started post-Grenfell. These structural tweaks, alongside modern communication tech (software that shares incident status to all commanders), will ensure critical information is not siloed. The result will be faster, better-informed decision-making during emergencies.
• Leadership and Cultural Training: London Fire Brigade’s leaders at all levels should undergo enhanced training in inclusive leadership and learning culture. A specific recommendation is to institute an annual “Safety and Culture Stand-down Day” by 2024, where normal routines pause for firefighters and officers to discuss case studies (like Grenfell) and voice safety concerns or ideas. Senior officers should actively participate and encourage open dialogue. This will help break the old culture of silence and reinforce that every voice matters in improving the brigade. Mentorship programs for junior staff, especially from under-represented groups, should be expanded so they feel supported and heard. Leadership performance reviews should include metrics on fostering team learning and diversity (e.g. 360-degree feedback from subordinates).
• Strengthen Organisational Learning and Accountability: London Fire Brigade should establish a dedicated Lessons Learned Unit reporting to top management, by 2025. This unit would systematically review major incidents and near-misses, track the implementation of recommendations, and publicly report on progress (much like aviation does). For instance, all action items from the Grenfell Inquiry and the independent culture review should be monitored by this unit until completion, with transparency to the Mayor’s Office and London Assembly. Additionally, introduce a confidential reporting system (a “staff safety hotline”) for firefighters and control staff to submit concerns or suggest improvements anonymously. By acting on these reports and closing the feedback loop, London Fire Brigade can cultivate a continuous improvement culture.
• Promote Diversity, Inclusion and Well-being: To eradicate the toxic elements identified in 2022, London Fire Brigade must continue and expand efforts in diversity and staff welfare. It is suggested that measurable goals for diversity (such as female and BAME firefighters) are set for 2025–2030 and that support programmes are put in place to keep those recruits. The brigade should strengthen its procedures for reporting misconduct and disciplining soldiers – with independent review of bullying or discrimination complaints to gain back trust. Making it clear in appraisals that respect and teamwork are important and that abusive behaviour leads to definite consequences, will send a strong zero-tolerance message. It is also very important to support mental health: London Fire Brigade must ensure that firefighters facing stress or trauma (from any source) can quickly get the support they need.

If these recommendations are put into practise, London Fire Brigade will become more flexible and welcoming. Following the lessons of Grenfell and using today’s leadership methods, London Fire Brigade can support both the public and its employees. Having strong traditions of courage and discipline, along with being adaptable, responsible and caring, will help the London Fire Brigade handle future problems.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the London Fire Brigade case study underscores the dual importance of organisational structure and culture in public sector organisations. London Fire Brigade’s bureaucratic structure provided a foundation of order and consistency, while its organisational culture shaped how that structure was enacted – for better and worse. A rigid hierarchy and role-defined culture contributed to operational failures in the Grenfell Tower tragedy, revealing the need for flexibility and learning in emergency services. At the same time, the Brigade’s strong team spirit and sense of duty have been key assets in its everyday lifesaving work.

Organisational behaviour theory reminds us that structure and culture are interdependent: as Schein noted, culture can underpin structures or be a product of them (Managers in Partnership, 2021). London Fire Brigade’s ongoing reforms illustrate this interplay – changes in formal structure (new communication systems, incident protocols) are being reinforced by shifts in culture (openness, accountability and inclusivity). By aligning its structure and culture with its mission, London Fire Brigade is striving to become a learning organisation that not only responds to emergencies effectively but also continuously improves. This case highlights that in the UK public sector context, adapting organisational structure and culture in light of experience and OB principles is essential to building a resilient, high-performing emergency service for the future.

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